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12 U.S.C. § 548 (x964):
"State taxation.
"The legislature of each State may determine and direct, subject to the provisions of this section,
the manner and place of taxing all the shares of national banking associations located within its
limits. The several States may (I) tax said shares, or (2) include dividends derived therefrom in
the taxable income of an owner or holder thereof, or (3) tax such associations on their net income,
or (4) according to or measured by their net income, provided the following conditions are com-
plied with:
x. (a) The imposition by any State of any one of the above four forms of taxation shall be
in lieu of the others, except as hereinafter provided in subdivision (c) of this clause.
(b) In the case of a tax on said shares the tax imposed shall not be at a greater rate than is
assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of such State coming
into competition with the business of national banks: Provided, That bonds, notes, or other
evidences of indebtedness in the hands of individual citizens not employed or engaged in the
banking or investment business and representing merely personal investments not made in
competition with such business, shall not be deemed moneyed capital within the meaning of
this section.
(c) In case of a tax on or according to or measured by the net income of an association,
the taxing State may, except in case of a tax on net income, include the entire net income
received from all sources, but the rate shall not be higher than the rate assessed upon other
financial corporations nor higher than the highest of the rates assessed by the taxing State
upon mercantile, manufacturing, and business corporations doing business within its limits:
Provided, however, That a State which imposes a tax on or according to or measured by the
net income of, or a franchise or excise tax on, financial, mercantile, manufacturing, and busi-
ness corporations organized under its own laws or laws of other States and also imposes a tax
upon the income of individuals, may include in such individual income dividends from national
banking associations located within the State on condition that it also includes dividends from
domestic corporations and may likewise include dividends from national banking associations
located without the State on condition that it also includes dividends from foreign corporations,
but at no higher rate than is imposed on dividends from such other corporations.
(d) In case the dividends derived from the said shares are taxed, the tax shall not be at a
greater rate than is assessed upon the net income from other moneyed capital.
2. The shares of any national banking association owned by nonresidents of any State shall
be taxed by the taxing district or by the State where the association is located and not else-
where; and such association shall make return of such shares and pay the tax thereon as agent
of such nonresident shareholders.
3. Nothing herein shall be construed to exempt the real property of associations from taxation
in any State or in any subdivision thereof, to the same extent, according to its value, as other
real property is taxed.
4. The provisions of section 5219 of the Revised Statutes of the United States as in force
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As we shall see, the meaning of the restrictions imposed by section 5219 is not
entirely clear. A well-rounded investigation requires a generous dose of legal ex-
pertise, something I lack. My interest is that of an economist who has worked with
two tax commissions in Maryland. The reform program jointly recommended by
these commissions was far-reaching, detailed, carefully worked out, and narrowly
defeated, at least in the first instance, by the Maryland General Assembly. Bank
taxation was only'one of hundreds of matters with which the commissions dealt, but
no part was more complex. This paper draws on the Maryland experience to illustrate
concretely the problems of selecting from among alternative approaches to taxation
of banks.
Although the stress here is on economic considerations, the legal intricacies of bank
taxation tend always to obscure the economics. These legal intricacies constitute a
major impediment to reform of bank taxes, partly because they impose restrictions on
the ways national banks can be taxed and partly because the law is unclear so that
it is difficult to know, in advance, whether a particular tax will stand up to a court
test.
I
A SHORT HISToRY OF SECTION 52192
Section 5219 originated in the 1864 revision of the National Banking Act of i8633
Provision was made for the states to enact taxes upon the shares of national banks
"at the place where such bank is located, and not elsewhere, but not at a greater
rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens
of such state ... [or] upon the shares in any of the banks organized under authority
of the State where such association is located."4 Repeated court tests have since up-
held the federal government's power to prescribe what taxes, if any, states can levy
on national banks.
In i868, the law was amended, primarily to allow shares of stockholders residing
in the state in which a national bank's head office was located to be taxed by the local
jurisdiction (city, county, special district) of residence of the owner, rather than by
the local jurisdiction in which the head office itself was located.' In addition, how-
ever, the prohibition of discriminatory taxes was shortened by dropping the reference
to state-chartered banks.
prior to March 25, x926, shall not prevent the legalizing, ratifying, or confirming by the
States of any tax heretofore paid, levied, or assessed upon the shares of national banks, or the
collecting thereof, to the extent that such tax would be valid under said section."
'This section draws heavily on Myers, Bank Taxation, in TAXATION IN MINNESOTA 277 (R. G. Blakey
ed. 1932), and R. B. WELcH, STATE AND LoCAL TAxATsON oF BANKS IN THE UNITED STATES (Special
Report No. 7 of the State Tax Corm'n, State of New York, 1934).
'Act of June 3, 1864, ch. io6, § 41, 13 Stat. iii.
"id. at 1X2.
5 E.g., First Nat'l Bank of Guthrie Center v. Anderson, 269 US. 341 (1926); Des Moines Nat'l Bank
v. Fairweather, 263 U.S. 103 (1923); Liberty Nat'1 Bank v. Buscaglia, 27o N.Y.S.2d 871 (App. Div.
1966); Irvine v. Spaeth, 210 Minn. 489, 299 N.W. 204 (940I).
'Act of Feb. io, x868, ch. 7, 15 Stat. 34.
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The prescription laid down in 1864 and amended in i868 produced a remarkable
uniformity of state taxes on banks. Nearly all states applied identical share taxes to
national banks and state-chartered banks and trust companies.
However, trouble was brewing. Inability to enforce taxation of intangibles at
general property tax rates led many states to adopt classified systems that applied
special low-rate taxes to most intangibles, in the justified hope of averting wholesale
evasion. But bank shares were generally not classified for low-rate taxation, since
evasion was not a problem and revenue from the share taxes was substantial. Did
this constitute illegal discrimination against national banks? Did "other moneyed
capital" mean only shares of state-chartered commercial banks, or did the term
embrace a wide range of intangible personal property, including that classified for
low-rate taxes? The legislative history of the 1868 amendment, and the wording of
the statute itself, left the matter very uncertain. This invited recurring litigation,
which culminated in the Supreme Court's 1921 Richmond decision.7  The Court
adopted a broad interpretation of "other moneyed capital" and found that favored
taxation of interest-bearing securities in the hands of individuals under a classified
property tax did discriminate against national banks.
The Richmond decision invalidated or called into serious question state taxes on
national bank shares in at least twenty states. The potential revenue losses were
great. Pressure for amendment of section 5219 brought results in 1923. The first
change altered the antidiscrimination clause relating to share taxes to read as follows:
... shall not be at a greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the
hands of individual citizens of such State coming into competition with the
business of national banks: Provided, That bonds, notes, or other evidences of in-
debtedness in the hands of individual citizens not employed or engaged in the
banking or investment business and representing merely personal investments
not made in competition with such business, shall not be deemed moneyed capital
within the meaning of this section.8
Even with this proviso, however, the meaning of "other moneyed capital" was inter-
preted rather broadly in a number of subsequent cases, and agitation for further
amendment continued.
The second major change in 1923 was provision for alternative bank taxes.10
Henceforth, a state could levy either of two taxes in lieu of the share tax. The first
was a tax on net income of national banks at a rate no higher than that assessed on
"other financial corporations nor higher than the highest of the rates assessed . . .
upon the net income of mercantile, manufacturing, and business corporations." The
TMerchants' Nat'l Bank v. City of Richmond, 256 U.S. 635 (1921).
B Act of March 4, 1923, ch. 267, 42 Star. 1499.
"E.g., First Nat'l Bank of Hartford v. City of Hartford, 273 U.S. 548 (1927); First Nat'l Bank of
Guthrie Center v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 341 (x926); Knowles v. First Nat'l Bank of Shenandoah, 58 F.2d
232 (8th Cir. 1932); People ex rel. Morris Plan Co. v. Burke, 253 N.Y. 85, 170 N.E. 502 (5930).
" Act of March 4, 5923, ch. 267, 42 Stat. X499.
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second was a tax on dividends in the hands of shareholders, at rates no higher than
those imposed upon net income from "other moneyed capital."
Neither the tax on dividends nor the income tax on banks was an acceptable
substitute for the old share tax, because neither would produce sufficient yields
while still meeting the restrictions relating to discrimination. Interest on federal and
most state and local obligations is exempt from state income taxes but figures im-
portantly in the operating revenues of commercial banks. Thus the law was amended
again in 1926 to permit still another method-an excise tax according to net income
"from all sources" (with the same discrimination safeguard as was provided for taxes
on net income in the 1923 amendment)-and also to permit use of the tax on divi-
dends concurrently with either the income or the excise tax (but not with the share
tax) as long as other corporate dividends were similarly taxed n The excise tax
base could include income from federal, state, and local securities because it was
not a "direct" tax on this income but merely an excise tax "measured by" it.
And so the statute stands today. Under section 5219, the states may tax banks
and their shareholders (i) on the value of shares, (2) on net income, (3) according
to net income from all sources, and (4) on dividends. Method (4) may be used with
methods (2) or (3), but otherwise the methods are mutually exclusive. In addition,
section 5219 provides that banks may be taxed on real estate at the same rates applied
to real estate in general. The meaning of provisions regarding discrimination against
national banks, both with respect to share taxes and with respect to excise and income
taxes, remains obscure, and this obscurity stands in the way of improvement of present
bank taxes. We shall return to this problem later, in a discussion of Maryland's
problems with bank taxation.
II
BANK TAxEs IN 1966
The accompanying table (pages 154-55) summarizes present state taxes on banks
under section 5219. Twenty-seven states still use the share tax, twenty employ the
excise levied according to net income, two-South Carolina and Wisconsin-levy
direct taxes on net income, and one-Washington-has no special bank taxes.12
The table reveals certain patterns. Excise and income taxes are largely confined
to states that tax individual and corporate incomes. All but one of the twenty-two
states that levy income or excise taxes also tax incomes of ordinary corporations, and
nineteen tax individual incomes. On the other hand, only sixteen of the twenty-seven
'Act of March 25, 1926, ch. 88, 44 Stat. 223.
"At least as far as I can tell from a reading of the state tax services. The tax on bank shares was
repealed in 1935 when Washington first imposed an income tax on banks and corporations. The income
tax was later declared unconstitutional, and the bank share tax was restored, only to be declared in-
operative by the Attorney General, apparently because it violated other provisions of Washington law.
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share-tax states tax corporate incomes, and fifteen tax individual incomes. The latter
states may not tax dividends on national bank stock, and typically the exemption is
also accorded to dividends of state banks.
Among the twenty-one states that levy excise or income taxes on banks and also
levy general corporation income taxes, the relation between bank tax rates and rates
paid by ordinary business corporations is highly variable. In several states the bank
tax rate is higher than the general income tax rates. In a few it is lower. In some
cases the rates are identical, and in two states, flat rates applied to banks are bracketed
by the high and low ends of the graduated rates paid by ordinary corporations.
Deduction of federal income taxes paid in calculating net income is allowed in
about half of the income-tax and excise-tax states. Such deductibility lowers the
effective rate on net income before taxes. For example, if a bank's federal tax is
thirty per cent of net income, and the state tax rate is ten per cent, the "effective rate"
is only seven per cent after deduction of federal tax paid.
About half of the states that impose excise taxes on banks also levy excise (or
franchise) taxes measured by net income on ordinary business corporations. The
rest tax corporate incomes directly. This point is potentially important, for reasons
that will be discussed later.
Among the share-tax states, the rates of tax applied to bank shares, and the assess-
ment methods, vary widely. Some states apply the general property tax rate to shares,
but many have special limited rates. Interstate comparisons of property taxation
are extremely difficult, because property tax laws and administration vary widely.
Furthermore, within the same state, there may be thousands of different tax rates
that could apply to bank shares, depending on the location of the bank and its share-
holders, the number of taxing jurisdictions, and the degree of overlapping of juris-
dictions.
In many states, state-chartered banks pay taxes that cannot be imposed on national
banks. At least one state (Montana) subjects state banks to both the bank share tax
and the corporation excise tax (measured by net income from all sources) and taxes
dividends on state bank stock under the individual income tax as well. National
banks pay only the share tax.
In general, one may conclude that if there is one "best" way to tax banks, most
states do not employ it.
III
THE PROBLEM IN MARYLAND: CASE STUDY OF A COMPLICATED CHOICE
With this background, let us consider the concrete case of Maryland to draw
out the implications involved in the choice among alternative bank taxes and to
illustrate the difficulties of making and implementing such a choice.
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STATE TAXES ON BANKS
1966
Rate of Individual
Corporation Income Tax
Rate of Tax on Bank Shares Income Tax State?
I. Share Taxes.
Arkansas General property tax rate on assessed value 1-5%* Yes
Delaware 1/5 of 1% of true value 5 Yes
Florida 1 mill per $1 on full cash value None No
Georgia 5 mills per S1 plus local levies on market value 5 Yes
Illinois General property tax rate on assessed value None No
Indiana 25" per $100 on actual value 2 Yes
Iowa 6 mills per $i on assessed value 3 Yes
Kansash 5 mills per $1 on value 4.5 Yes
Kentucky 500 per $100 plus local levies on cash value 5-7* Yes
louisiana General property tax rate on 50% of value 4 Yes
Maine 15 mills per $1 of assessed valueo None No
Maryland State rate plus local tax of $1 per $100
of assessed value 5 Yes
Michigan 5.5 mills per $1 of capital None No
Mississippi General property tax rate on assessed value 2-3* Yes
Montana General property tax rate on 30% of true value 5.25 Yes
Nebraska 8 mills per $1 on actual value None No
Nevada General property tax rate on 35% of cash value None No
New Hampshire 1% of par valuee None No
New Jersey 3/4 of 1% of true value 1.75d Yes
New Mexico General property tax rate on actual value 3 Yes
Ohio 2 mills per S1 on book value None No
Pennsylvania 8 mills per $1 on actual value 6 No
Tennessee General property tax rate on actual cash value 4 No
Texas General property tax rate on actual cash value None No
Virginia 10 mills per $1 plus local levies on actual value 5 Yes
West Virginia General property tax rate on actual value None Yes
Wyoming General property tax rate on par value None No
*Graduated.
.'Typically, the assesedvalue of real estateis deducted from thevalueof shares to arrive at the share-tax base. The value is frequentlydetermined by adding together the amount of capital, surplus, and undivided profits. In other cases, market value, capitalized carnlng,
and miscellaneous other approaches are employed.bKanss imposes a 5% excise tax on net income in lieu of the share tax.
cApplies to national banks. No mention of tax on Etate-chartered commercial banks is made in CCH srAn TUX onrmn.dPlns net worth or assets tax.
A. Current Practice in Maryland
Maryland taxes the shares of its forty-six national banks, seventy-two state-
chartered commercial banks, and domestic and foreign finance companies at a
limited rate of $i per $ioo of assessed value for local purposes and at the general
property tax rate ($0.15 per Soo in 1967) for state purposes. The $1 local tax is
distributed to the jurisdiction of residence of the shareholder, except that the tax on
shares belonging to out-of-state residents goes to the jurisdiction where the head office
of the bank is located. Shares are assessed at market value less the assessed value of
real estate subject to the general property tax.
The share tax produced $4.9 million in fiscal 1964, roughly one-half of one per cent
of total state and local tax revenue. Of this, $4.2 million was paid on bank shares;
the rest was tax on shares of finance companies.
Maryland's only other tax on intangible property is a tax on shares of domestic
public utilities, levied at the full state and local general property tax rates. All other
intangibles taxes were abolished in 1937 when the individual and corporation income
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STATE TAXEs ON BANKS-Continued
1966
Federal Federal
Income Rate of Income Individual
Rate of Tax De- Corporation Tax De- Income Tax,
Bank Tax ductible? Income Tax ductible? State?
II. Excise Taxe3
A. States with Direct Taxes on
Net Income of Ordinary
Corporations
Alabama 6% Yes 5% Yes Yes
Alaska 2 No 18% of fed- No Yes
eral income
tax
Arizona 5 Yes 1.3-6.6* Yes Yes
Colorado 6 No 5 No Yes
Hawaii 11.7 No 5.85-6.435* No Yes
Missouri 7 Yes 2 Yes Yes
North Carolina 4.5 No 6 No Yes
North Dakota 4 Yes 3-5* Yes Yes
Oklahoma 4 Yes 4 Yes Yes
Rhode Island 60 No 6e No No
B. States with Excise Taxes
According to Net Income
of Ordinary Corporations
California 9.5f No 5.5 No Yes
Connecticut 5.25, No 5.25e No No
Idaho 6 No 6+810 No Yes
excise
Massachusetts 8(max.)9 No 6.765e No Yes
Minnesota 12.54 Yes 10.23 Yes Yes
New York 4.5 No 5.5e No Yes
Oregon 8 No 6 No Yes
Utah 6e Yes 6e Yes Yes
Vermont 5 No 5 No Yes
C. State with Excise Tax on
Net Income of Banks and
No Excise or Income Taxes
on Income of Ordinary
Corporations
South Dakota 4.5 Yes None - No
III. Direct Income Taxes
South Carolina 4.5% No 5% No Yes
Wisconsin 2-7* Yesh 2-7* Yesh Yes
*Graduated.
oOr alternative tax, whichever is greater.tMlate for 1965; the rate is determined annually.
iDetermined annually.
bJWiLconsin limits the deduction to 10% of net income before federal tax.
Note: Washington imposes no share, excise, or income taxes on banks.
Source: CCH sTAT TAX Guni.
taxes were enacted.
All banks and finance companies are exempt from state and local tangible personal
property taxes, and dividends on their stocks are exempt from the state individual
Income tax. Thus the required exemption of national banks and their dividends from
these taxes is extended to state banks and finance companies. State banks and
finance companies are, however, subject to the state general sales tax on their pur-
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chases of taxable items. And finance companies must pay the corporation income
tax, though national and state banks are exempt.
Savings and loan associations and mutual savings banks in Maryland are taxed
at a low rate on gross income from investments. Ordinary business corporations are
taxed five per cent on net income allocable to Maryland (without deductibility of
federal income tax). Ordinary business corporations and unincorporated businesses,
like banks, are subject to tax on real property. Unlike banks, they are taxed on
tangible personal property, and these taxes, which are highly variable because of
differing local exemptions, are, in the aggregate, substantial. In addition, ordinary
businesses, like state banks, but unlike national banks, are subject to sales tax on their
purchases of machinery, equipment, and certain supplies. This summary serves to
indicate some of the complexities of business taxation in Maryland, although it
ignores many complications that are not relevant to the problem of bank taxation.
B. Tax Reform and the Banks: The Finding of Overtaxation
In 1962 the Governor of Maryland appointed a special commission to study the
State's fiscal problems. Early in 1965 this commission delivered a comprehensive
plan of fiscal reform.
A Special Legislative Commission was named to study this plan and recommend
legislation to the 1966 General Assembly. For the most part, the Special Legislative
Commission accepted the guidelines that had been laid down by the Governor's
Commission. The two commissions were not pleased with business taxation as they
found it. In general, their recommended changes in business taxes reflect a belief
that the taxes are now both too high and too diverse. The proposals envisaged a
reduction or elimination of several special taxes on businesses, an expanded scope
for the corporation income tax, and elimination of local taxes on business tangible
personal property, to be replaced by a uniform low-rate state tax on this property.
The over-all tax program extended far beyond reforms of business taxation and aimed
at greater reliance on individual and corporate income taxes as opposed to property
and miscellaneous ievies.
As for the tax on bank shares, the Governor's Commission had concluded that
banks are overtaxed and are probably taxed by the wrong method. Under Maryland
law, bank shares are assessed at book value, market value, or net earnings after
federal taxes capitalized at tea per cent, whichever is highest. In the case of all
large banks, market value dominates; it produces a tax base about twenty-five per cent
higher than the capitalization method. At $1.15 per $ioo, the share tax amounts, on
the average, to about fourteen per cent of net income after federal taxes, and about
ten per cent of net income before-federal taxes. The ordinary business corporation, it
will be recalled, pays state income tax of five per cent of net income before federal
taxes, but also pays other taxes not paid by banks.
These figures indicated to the Commission that banks are overtaxed. The banks,
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needless to say, were not alarmed by this conclusion. Indeed, they had complained
about their taxes from time to time, although they had not made any concerted effort
to get the law changed or to call the problem to the attention of either commission.
After publication of the original (Governor's) Commission report, the Maryland
Bankers Associaiton (MBA) appointed a committee to make specific recommenda-
tions to the Legislative Commission, which had to develop a concrete plan of reform.
In a statement published in the summer of 1965, the MBA committee recommended
that the state either revise the share-tax assessment method-assessing all shares at ten
times earnings after federal taxes--or enact an excise tax based on net income from
all sources without deduction of federal taxes. The rate of the latter, the MBA com-
mittee advised, should be lower than the five per cent rate paid by ordinary corpora-
tions, so as to reduce or eliminate the possibility that the excise tax, whose base in-
cludes income that is ordinarily tax-exempt, would be found to discriminate against
national banks.
The Legislative Commission then turned to making up its own mind. The
Commission's goals were easily stated: to tax national and state banks uniformly;
to tax competing financial institutions as banks were taxed; to tax financial institutions
in general no more heavily, or more lightly, than business in general.
C. Excise Tax vs. Direct Income Tax
The first question was whether a shift from taxation of shares to either the income
tax or the excise tax was appropriate. This led to consideration, first, of the relative
merits of the two "income tax" approaches.
Because banks hold a large proportion of their total assets in federal and state and
local government bonds, the base of a direct income tax on banks is probably less
than half as large as that of an excise tax on net earnings from all sources.13  One
would not want to choose the excise tax simply because its base is larger. Thinking
of this sort has led to such monstrosities as the turnover taxes still used by some
nations and states. The question is whether the exemptions are merited.
Federal exemption of interest on state and local bonds has for years been contro-
18 Revenue from interest on federal, state, and local government securities is, for many-probably
most-banks, as great as or greater than net income before federal income taxes. The most useful data
available to the Maryland Commission were the summary tables of income of insured commercial banks
in the United States and in Maryland published in the x964 FDIC ANN. REP. 194-215. In 1964, FDIC data
show that aggregate income from government bonds of all insured commercial banks in Maryland
amounted to nearly 8o% of net income before federal income taxes. It is clear from this aggregate data that
exclusion of this income in calculating taxable income would, in a great many cases, reduce the tax base
to zero. Only calculation on a bank-to-bank basis can indicate the precise size of the tax base.
Moreover, income data reported to the FDIC are not identical with the data on which income taxes
are based. (If deduction of federal income taxes were allowed in the determination of taxable income for
state purposes, the state income tax base would probably be zero in all but a few cases. Maryland does
not allow deduction of federal taxes under the individual or ordinary corporation income taxes, however.)
The erosion of the tax base due to tax-exempt interest income could be reduced if allowable deductions
were also reduced. Thus, the state might disallow interest and operating costs allocable to the tax-
exempt bond portfolio. Despite the logic of this approach, the fact that the federal government does
not follow it casts considerable doubt on its feasibility for Maryland.
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versial. Defenders argue that exemption protects the sovereignty of the states and
saves them money. Opponents stress that loss of tax revenue to the federal govern-
ment exceeds the interest saving to state and local governments; that exemption per-
mits individual taxpayers in the highest brackets to avoid much of the bite of federal
income taxes into investment income; and that the exemption discourages wealthy
investors from committing their funds to higher-priority private undertakings. 4
Whatever are the merits of the dispute over exemption of interest on municipals
from federal tax, it is hard to imagine that a state today would confer exemption
on interest from federal obligations out of solicitude for the strength of the federal
establishment or its fiscal problems. Thus the Commission had no trouble deciding
that an excise tax on income from federal bonds was acceptable.
What about interest on the state's own bonds and those of its subdivisions? Ex-
emption presumably lowers the cost of selling municipals, and revenue gains from
a tax on interest must be weighted against the higher interest cost that results from
the tax.
It turns out that the gains exceed the cost. To demonstrate this point, we start by
supposing that all state and local bonds are sold to commercial banks within the
state. In this case, given the after-tax net yield that will induce banks to hold the
entire supply of bonds issued, the pretax yield must be high enough to cover any
tax on the interest. For example, with a five per cent tax, the bank keeps 0.95 of
interest earned, and an issue that could be placed at three per cent if tax exempt
would have to return three per cent --- .95, or 3.158 per cent, to yield three per cent
after tax.
But this example ignores an important point: commercial banks pay federal in-
come tax. In arriving at federal taxable income, they deduct state and local taxes
paid. Imposition of state taxes on interest from municipals reduces the federal tax
base.
For a bank facing the top-bracket forty-eight per cent federal corporation income
tax rate-and most taxable bank income does fall in this bracket-payments of state
taxes cost, net, only fifty-two cents on the dollar. Thus, a pretax yield of 3.08 per
cent on a state bond, taxed at five per cent by the state, would produce a net yield
after both state and federal taxes of three per cent. Denial of exemption, then,
would raise the state's interest cost by eight cents per year per $ioo of debt, but tax
revenue would increase by $3.o8 X .05, or 15.4 cents.
Beyond this consideration, not all state and local bonds are sold to banks within
the issuing state. In fact, nationally, only about one-third of all municipals are held
by banks, and some of those are held by banks outside the state of issue. This means
that removal of tax exemption for only the banks within the state will not necessitate
a fully compensating increase in pretax yield because as the yield rises, other non-
"'A taxpayer facing the top (7o%) marginal rate would net, after tax, as much from a 3% municipal
bond as he would from a taxable investment yielding xo%.
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taxable investors-nonbank investors within and outside the state, and banks outside
the state-will absorb a larger portion of the total debt. Banks will have to settle for
a lower after-tax yield and will presumably hold a lower share of the total debt.
Thus, exemption of interest on its own bonds held by banks costs the state money,
and not an insignificant amount.'5 The interest cost argument must therefore be
dismissed.
But more fundamentally, is it equitable and conducive to efficiency to exempt
bank income derived from state, local, and federal bonds? The Commission felt it
was not and the MBA agreed. Consider what happens with exemption. The ratio
of government bond income to net income before income taxes varies greatly from
bank to bank. A direct tax on income will produce a much smaller yield than an
excise tax at the same rate; it will also produce a different distribution of the
total burden. The differences are substantial. For example, nationally, FDIC figures
for 1965 show that only banks in size groups over $Ioo million total deposits had, in
the aggregate, net income before income taxes in excess of income from government
bonds. 6 Thus, nearly all of the burden of an income tax would fall on very large
banks. Many-perhaps most-banks would pay zero tax. Even among banks of the
same size, and in similar regions, there are substantial differences in holdings of
government securities relative to private loans.
It is hard to see why it is either equitable or conducive to efficiency to confer
complete exemption to banks that specialize in government securities when other
businesses, including banks that make substantial business, consumer, and mortgage
loans, pay substantial amounts. It would be easier to make a case for precisely the
opposite policy. The Maryland Legislative Commission did not, therefore, seriously
consider recommending the direct income tax.
D. Excise Tax vs. Share Tax
The relevant comparison, then, was between the share tax, with modifications,
and the excise tax. To begin this comparison, assume that the assessed value of shares
bears some fixed relation-say ten times-to net earnings before federal taxes. Then
the share tax for any bank will have the same yield as an excise tax at a rate one-tenth
as high. But states levying the share tax cannot tax dividends to holders of national
bank stocks, and most (perhaps all) states, like Maryland, grant parallel treatment
to state-bank stockholders. In 1964, net income before income taxes of all insured
commercial banks in Maryland was $45.3 million, and dividends were $io.8 million.
17
The added revenue from the individual income tax on dividends would be substantial
" It should be noted, however, that an intergovernmental transfer, in favor of the state and against
its subdivisions, occurs because the tax is paid to the state but the higher interest costs are partly paid
by the subdivisions.
10 x965 FDIC ANN. Rnp. 16o.1 Nationally, dividends are higher-about one-third of net income before income taxes in 1964.
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-about one-fourth of the bank tax yield if individuals pay tax on dividends at the
same rate banks pay under an excise tax."
The assumption of a given capitalization rate applied to the current year's income
is not realistic. Presumably states are free to adopt laws requiring assessment accord-
ing to a statutory capitalization rate, but few, if any, do. If market values, book
values, or other considerations enter into the assessment, the percentage that net in-
come bears to the share-tax base will differ from bank to bank and from time to time.
Should a bank be taxed on its actual income or on the capitalized value of its
expected income as reflected in the market value of its shares? The difference will be
substantial even if total tax yields under the alternative methods are the same. New
banks may have much future promise but little present income. Growing banks
will, presumably, have higher price-earnings ratios than stable or declining banks.
Should new banks or growing banks pay higher taxes in relation to current
income? Should movements of the capitalization ratio over time, either as a trend,
or as a reflection of cycles in bank income, change the level of taxes in relation to
income? If capital values are superior to net income for bank taxes, so should they
be for all other business taxes. The Maryland Commission showed no interest in
moving business taxation toward a capital value base. Rather, it was trying to move
in the opposite direction. Uniform treatment of banks and other businesses led logi-
cally to rejection of a share tax based on the market value of bank stock.
This left the choice between an excise tax and a modified share tax with share
values to be established by capitalization of annual net income at a specified uniform
rate. The two approaches could not be made precisely equivalent because of the
dividend exemption under the share tax required by section 5219. But the rate of
tax on shares could be made high enough to produce a yield that would be the
equivalent of the total yield of an excise tax and the tax on dividends to individuals.
The equivalence would not be precise, because the ratio of dividends to net income
varies among banks. Low-dividend banks would be disadvantaged, and high-
dividend banks would be advantaged, by the share-tax approach. Moreover, with a
graduated individual income tax, which the Commission was also recommending,
high-bracket bank stockholders would be given an advantage at the expense of low-
bracket stockholders by the "equivalent" share-tax approach.
Still another important consideration argued for the excise tax. The Commission
had decided to recommend elimination of the tax on shares of public utilities and to
subject utilities instead to the corporation income tax, from which they are now
" The prohibition of dividend taxes in share-tax states seems to be based on the notion that taxation
both of the value of shares and of dividends received by shareholders would constitute "double taxation."
The share tax is conceived as a tax on the shareholder, not on the bank. In the eyes of the law-or
at least in the eyes of § 5 219-the bank merely serves as collecting agent.
The same double-taxation argument applies, logically, to an excise tax based on net income-or to
any corporation income tax. If a state taxes income of ordinary corporations, and also taxes dividends
as individual income, it is already "double taxing." It is hard to see why the state should avoid
"double taxation" of bank income but not of income of ordinary corporations.
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exempt. Removal of the bank share tax would eliminate the last vestige of in-
tangibles taxes from the system.
Unification and simplification of the tax structure have many advantages, not the
least of which is that they make the tax system easier to understand. The enormous
complexity of state fiscal systems is largely senseless, and it constitutes an important
barrier to informed policy decisions. Legislators, to say nothing of the citizenry,
have enough trouble educating themselves without having to deal with endless tech-
nicalities that are the legacy of historical accident.
E. The Uncertain Status of an Excise Tax
For these reasons, the Legislative Commission decided in favor of the excise tax.
The decision was tentative because it was not entirely clear that an excise tax levied
at a rate high enough to avoid discriminating in favor of banks relative to other
businesses would stand up to a court test under the discrimination provisions of section
5219. Paradoxically, a shift to an excise tax that lowers the tax burden on banks raises
the risk of violating section 5219.
It is important to note that this risk arose despite the fact that the Commission
did not propose to tax bank income under the excise tax at a rate higher than the
rate levied on the income of ordinary business corporations. A glance at the table
of state taxes on banks will show that nearly half of the twenty excise tax states
impose higher rates on banks than on income of ordinary corporations. In two states
-California and Massachusetts-the bank tax rate is set annually. California taxes
banks at the basic 5.5 per cent rate applied to ordinary corporations and imposes an
additional tax, up to a maximum of four per cent, determined annually to reflect the
total of other taxes paid by ordinary corporations from which banks are exempt. It
is noteworthy that the maximum additional rate of four per cent has been imposed
in recent years.
The Commission did not favor the California approach. There is no reason
to believe that ordinary business corporations are affected in the same way by, say,
a tangible personal property tax that happens, after the fact, to be equal to one, or
five, or eight per cent of its net income as they are by an income tax at the same
rate. The same applies to sales taxes and other miscellaneous levies imposed on busi-
nesses. It is simply not correct to assert that all taxes deemed legally to be paid by
corporations are equivalent to taxes based on net income. It is perfectly possible that
all such taxes taken together might exceed ioo per cent of net income. That fact
would not call for a ioo per cent tax on bank net income.
The California approach has the added defect of using average taxes for other
businesses to determine bank taxes (up to the four per cent maximum). If the other
business taxes are appropriate taxes, the appropriate bank tax would be, not an
average of what other businesses pay in relation to net income, but rather the taxes
162 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
the individual bank would pay on the same bases-tangible personal property, pur-
chases subject to sales tax, and so forth.
Even though the bogus precision of the California tax must be rejected, there
remains a case for imposing an excise tax on banks at a rate somewhat higher than
the rate of income tax on ordinary corporations, in recognition of the fact that
banks are to some undetermined degree advantaged by exemption from other state
and local taxes.
This idea has some appeal, but its application is hazardous. The situation is
complicated, not only by uncertainty about the "advantages" of banks, but also by
uncertainty concerning the amount of income corporations receive from tax-exempt
government securities. Equity and section 5219 both demand that attempts to
equalize taxes on banks and other businesses recognize not only that banks escape
some taxes paid by other businesses but also that other businesses may escape some
taxes paid by banks. Moreover, comparisons of tax burdens must be made against a
common base.
In this respect, Maryland's situation differs from that of about half of the twenty
states that now levy excise taxes on banks. These states, shown as Group II-B in
the table of state taxes on banks, also tax ordinary corporations under excise taxes
based on income "from all sources" rather than under direct taxes on income. In
this case, one could be fairly certain that a bank excise tax moderately higher than
the ordinary corporation excise tax would stand up in court, since it would need to
be shown only that, in addition to the excise tax based on net income, ordinary busi-
ness corporations pay other taxes from which banks are exempt.
But Maryland, like many other states, levies a direct tax on net income of
ordinary corporations. Adoption of the bank excise tax, at the same rate as the
income tax on ordinary corporations, would raise the question of discrimination
in favor of ordinary corporations. The advantage of tax-exempt interest to ordinary
corporations would have to be weighed against the advantage to banks of exemption
from some taxes, most notably the tangible personal property tax, paid by ordinary
corporations.
The guiding consideration is the Oklahoma decision of I94. ° In that decision,
which is the law today, the Supreme Court held that "discrimination is not shown
merely because a few individual corporations, out of a class of several thousand which
ordinarily bear the same or a heavier tax burden, may sustain a lighter tax than
that imposed on national banking associations." '2  Banks in Oklahoma paid an
excise tax measured by net income of six per cent and ordinary corporations paid a
six per cent direct tax on net income. In comparing tax burdens, the Court con-
sidered the fact that some nonbank corporations held tax-exempt government securi-
ties. It determined, however, that they also paid a corporation franchise tax not
19 Tradesmens Nat'l Bank v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 309 U.S. 560 (940).
20 d. at 568.
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imposed on national banks, in an amount greater than the tax that would have been
due had government bond interest been taxed.
Thus the view of the Court in the Oklahoma decision seemed to be that total
taxes would be compared on the basis of the broader definition of "income from all
sources." If the comparison were made on the narrower definition (income ex-
cluding interest on tax-exempts), the Oklahoma decision surely would have gone the
other way, since many banks that paid excise taxes would have had zero or negative
tax bases under the narrow definition.
The Oklahoma decision did not mention tangible personal property or sales
taxes in its comparisons of tax burdens on national banks and ordinary business
corporations. These are the major taxes from which national banks are exempt under
section 5219. Before deciding where to set the bank excise tax rate, the Maryland
Legislative Commission needed legal advice on the meaning of the law. In par-
ticular, the Commission needed to know whether the excise tax rate could be set
higher than the corporation income tax rate. A firm from outside the state, known
for its expertise on section 5219, was retained. Counsel was fairly reassuring that
the broad definition used by the Court in the Oklahoma comparisons would also
be made in any court test of the proposed Maryland excise tax. But the attorneys
could not give assurance that an excise tax levied at a rate higher than the ordinary
corporate tax rate would stand up. Such assurance, if it were forthcoming at all,
would have to be based on a detailed and costly study of individual business firms'
tax payments, a study the Commission was in no position to make in the limited
time available.
In fact, the Commission never could establish with certainty that an excise tax
levied at the same rate as the ordinary corporation income tax would stand a court
test. Despite the Oklahoma decision, there remained a possibility that the court
would compare tax burdens in relation to income excluding tax-exempt interest.
This uncertainty could not be dispelled despite the fact that several states shown in
Group II-A of the table of state taxes on banks impose bank excise taxes at rates equal
to or greater than the rates imposed on income of ordinary corporations that enjoy
exemption of government bond interest. After consultation with representatives of
the Maryland Bankers Association and with the Attorney General's office, and in the
light of the opinion of out-of-state counsel, a decision was finally made to recom-
mend abandonment of the present share tax in favor of an excise tax on banks
and finance companies at the same rate as the income tax on ordinary corporations.
F. Problems of Uniform Taxation
Abolition of the Maryland share tax would remove the exemption of state banks
and finance companies from tax on their tangible personal property, since, under
Maryland law, this exemption is predicated on payment of the share tax. National
banks, as we have noted, cannot be required to pay this tax. The Commission there-
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fore recommended specific exemption of tangible personal property of state banks and
finance companies. It did not, however, recommend exemption of state banks and
finance companies from retail sales tax on purchases of equipment, furniture, and
supplies, even though national banks do not pay the tax. The Maryland sales tax
is already riddled with exemptions, which greatly complicates administration of
the tax. The Commission was loath to make matters worse.21
The end result was that the proposed taxation of state and national banks would
remain about as close to uniform as it is under the share tax, with national banks
still slightly favored; but the discrimination against finance companies, which pay
both share taxes and income taxes, would be removed. The major gain would be that
the discrimination against banks and finance companies vis-a-vis ordinary corpora-
tions would be removed. Final pronouncements about the matter are not easily
made, but, in my view, the proposed system, if it discriminated at all, discriminated
in favor of banks and finance companies.
In terms of its own goals, then, the Commission's recommendations can be given
a high score if we recognize the handicaps imposed by section 5219. Bank taxes would
be lower, sales finance companies would no longer be taxed twice, and the elimina-
tion of the bank share tax would complete the process of simplifying the tax struc-
ture by erasing the last vestige of intangible personal property taxation. Without
the restrictions of section 5219, of course, the Commission could have done better.
G. The Cooperative Institutions
There remained unsolved one problem-the taxation of cooperative financial
institutions. There is no question that Maryland taxes discriminate against banks
a~d finance companies vis-a-vis mutual savings banks and savings and loan associa-
tions. These institutions pay a much lighter tax, which is based on gross investment
income.
To date, the courts have not forced the issue in other states, as far as I know.
Apparently share capital of savings and loan associations is not considered "other
moneyed capital" coming into substantial competition with banks. The archaic
precedent based on the quaint view of savings and loans as cooperative bands of
poor persons who finance one another's modest homes apparently persists in the
cdurts.22 It is hard to believe that this will continue.
Notwithstanding the absence of legal compulsion, the Maryland Commission
perhaps would have been inclined to explore the present taxation of savings and loans
2 1 it also was loath to make them better. The only major recommendation of the original Gov-
ernor's Commission that was rejected entirely by the Legislative Commission was a controversial proposed
revamping of the sales tax.
'22 See, e.g., Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Department of Revenue, 358 Mich. 6rx, 627-39, soX N.W.2d
245, 253-59 (I96O), a0'd sub nom. Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Michigan, 365 U.S. 467 (1961); Hoenig v.
Huntington Nat'l Bank, 59 F.2d 479, 482 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 648 (1932). But see the
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Whittaker in Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Michigan, supra at 483.
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and mutual savings banks had the legislature not already been through a battle in its
1965 session to enact the present taxes on these institutions.
Since this is clearly a proper subject of further study in Maryland and many
other states, let us consider what might be the general findings of a future Maryland
commission that considered this problem.
First, the commission would discover that practices among the states vary so
widely as to defy description. Second, if the share tax on banks is still in use by
the state, the commission will have to decide whether shares of S & Ls are the equiva-
lent of shares of capital stock of commercial banks. What about time deposits of
mutual savings banks? Are they the equivalent of commercial bank time deposits?
Are S & L shares and mutual savings bank deposits equivalent? The difference these
decisions will make is, of course, enormous. If shares are deemed to be the equiva-
lent of commerical time deposits, what is the equivalent of commercial bank capital?
Reserves and undivided capital of shareholders? Undivided capital of shareholders
but not reserves?
Or if the state is levying an excise tax on banks, can the same tax be used for
S & Ls and mutual savings banks? What is net income of a cooperative? Total
net income before dividends to shareholders? Net income after dividend distribu-
tions-i.e., additions to undivided capital? Net income after distributions plus
additions to reserves?
I hazard the guess that such a commission would look favorably on retention
of the present tax on gross income from investments, levied at a rate that produces
a yield closer to the tax that would be paid if net income after dividend distribu-
tions were taxed at the same rate as bank net income from all sources, than to the
tax that would be paid if the bank rate were applied to net income of the coopera-
tives before distributions. The commission might wish that it could recommend a
tax on gross investment income of all financial institutions, corporate and cooperative.
That approach would merit careful study, except that it cannot be applied to national
banks.
Section 5219 will surely give such a future commission as much trouble as it has
given past ones.
IV
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Up to this point, the lessons of Maryland's experience with bank tax reform seem
fairly clear and inspire a reasonable degree of optimism. Revision of bank taxes is no
easy matter, primarily because of section 5219. Since national banks cannot be made
to pay all of the taxes normally levied on ordinary businesses, complete uniformity
is impossible. But substantial progress toward this goal is possible. In states that
tax incomes of ordinary corporations, the excise tax on banks seems superior to the
alternatives permitted under section 5219. The case for rates under the excise tax that
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are either higher or lower than those applied to net income of ordinary corporations
is hard to make.
A curious fact is that section 5219 provides banks with more protection against
discrimination under income and excise taxes than under the share tax. The pro-
vision that the tax be no "higher than the highest of the rates" imposed on ordinary
business corporations applies only to the income and excise taxes. The share tax
burden can be higher, so long as it does not violate the "other moneyed capital
coming into competition" provision. Thus the Maryland Commission's recommenda-
tion, even though it aimed at eliminating overtaxation under the share tax, raised
the risk-probably not very great-of an adverse court decision in the event that a
national bank contested the excise tax.
No two states will be entirely alike, because no two states have exactly the same
approach to business taxation. But in any state, attempts to develop a more rational
system of bank taxation probably require more analytical study, expert counsel, and
data of the kind that is not likely to be readily available, than almost any other
specific problem of tax reform. At all times, it seems, the major difficulty is to keep
the economic considerations from being submerged in a sea of legal confusion.
But given persistence, the end result may be fortunate.
V
AN EPILorUE
But then it may not. The Maryland tax reform program of 1966 failed, mostly
because it called for a controversial new system of state aid to local government that
would have funneled money from the high-income suburban areas into the City
of Baltimore and the poorer counties. But before the program was voted down by
a narrow margin, the new bank tax proposal was amended.
On March 15, two weeks before the end of the 1966 session of the General Assem-
bly of Maryland, and at a time when political lines had hardened and rational
consideration of the issues was nearly impossible, the State Treasurer sent a letter
to the Chairman of the Legislative Commission opposing the new bank tax. This
letter, and attached memoranda based on discussion with state bond counsel and some
unnamed investment bankers, made the following statements:
[I]f the State includes State and municipal bonds . . . as a basis for mea-
suring the franchise tax on financial institutions, it could hardly argue with very
much conviction that the Federal government should not also eliminate the tax
exemption and tax them the same as other corporate securities. As you know, a
number of attempts have been made to do just that. It is estimated that to subject
State bonds to the Federal income tax would have the effect of increasing the rate
by approximately 1-4% to 2%. This would also add a substantial burden to the
taxpayer in the additional cost of financing State of Maryland, county and munici-
pal bond issues at the higher rate necessary to sell non-tax exempt bonds.
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... [T]he effect of such a franchise tax ... is not restricted to just the financial
institutions but would have a psychological and actual effect on the other purchasers,
who might figure that due to this change in the status of financial institutions the
market for resale ... of State of Maryland bonds would be adversely affected with
the loss of the present ready market furnished by financial institutions in the State
of Maryland.
Due to the present very difficult market situation for bonds of any type, the
Treasurer's Office will soon announce the policy of accepting pledges of State of
Maryland bonds by Maryland banks to protect deposits in those banks with the
thought that this will encourage the purchase of Maryland bonds by financial
institutions and thereby, through improvement of the market, decrease the cost
to the State of Maryland bond issues. The possible adverse effect of eliminating the
tax exempt status under this franchise tax will instead, of course, have the effect of
decreasing the marketability.
It is entirely possible that the additional revenue earned by this section of the
proposed Bill by including the interest received from State, county and municipal
obligations within the definition of net earnings rather than continuing the present
exemption, when considering the very large issues of tax exempt bonds of the
counties and municipalities as well as the State, may be more costly in the long run
than the revenue produced by it would be worth.
This was an unthinking attack. First, twenty states already use the excise tax.
I presume that they do not feel inhibited in arguing against federal taxation of
state bonds. It is hard, in any event, to believe that the larger issue would turn on
Maryland's decision to adopt a tax expressly permitted by section 5219.
Second, and most important, the share tax at present does not exempt state and
local bonds. The prospect that denying a tax exemption that does not exist for banks
in the first place would cause all this harm is remote. But the advice of bond counsel
is not easy to ignore. At this late date, in the midst of all the confusion surrounding
legislative consideration of a wide-ranging program, it did not seem that this advice
could be effectively met. So, in the interest of saving the larger bill, the Commission
retreated to its second choice, an excise tax on bank capital assessed at ten times earn-
ings, at a rate sufficient to produce the same revenue as the combined excise tax and
tax on bank dividends distributed to individuals. Interest on government bonds
was, by the way, to be included in net income for capitalization purposes. Bond
counsel seemed not to mind that.
As I have noted, the bill failed in any event. But in 1967, the General Assembly
passed a bill that represents the first instalment in the over-all reform of Maryland's
fiscal system. The 1967 bill dealt with all aspects of reform except business taxation.
That thorny problem is on the agenda of the 1968 session. Bank taxes will doubtless
cause as much trouble in 1968 as they did two years earlier. If the lessons of 1966
are remembered, perhaps the farcical episode touched off by the Treasurer will not
be repeated.
